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CONTRACTUAL INDEMNIFICATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Shane M. O'Connell 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By necessity, the federal government contracts with private entities to perform inherently 
dangerous and highly hazardous activities such as hazardous waste disposal, 1 environmental spill 
cleanup,2 weapon manufacturing, military mission support,3 nuclear waste disposal,4 and large-
scale construction projects. In such contracts the likelihood of lawsuit is extremely high, and, 
thus, the parties have a significant incentive to include provisions allocating the risk oflawsuit or 
injury to one party or the other. Allocation of risk in private and public contracts is frequently 
accomplished through indemnification provisions or insurance provisions allocating risk of loss. 5 
While private parties are able to incorporate either indemnification or insurance provisions into 
their contracts, public entities are not similarly unrestrained. 
Indemnification provisions allocate the risk of lawsuit or compensation for damage to one 
party in a contract in exchange for compensation either in the form of other beneficial contract 
terms or financial compensation. 6 Indemnification provides an opportunity for a party without 
sufficient capital to cover a large lawsuit to shift the risk of loss to another party in exchange for 
1 Clean Venture, Inc, B-284176, 2000 CPO~ 47 (Comp. Gen. March 6, 2000). 
'Department of the Interior Contract with Industrial Economics, Inc., $7,000,000 Contract Awarded for the 
Emergency Response for the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, (July 12, 2010) (contract data on file with author). 
3 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-ll-192, Further Action Needed to Better Implement Requirements for 
Conducting Inventory of Service Contract Activities (Jan 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/314659.pdf. 
4 Contract with Duke Energy Corporation, William States Lee II Nuclear Station- Unit I, Contract# DE-CROI-
09R W09003 (Nov. 4, 2008), available at 
http ://www.ieer.org/reports/DOE _ WasteContracts20 I 0/09R W09003 %20William%20States%20Lee%20III%20 l.pd 
f; Contract with PPL Bell Bend, LLC, Bell Bend Nuclear Power Plant, Contract# DE-CROI-09RW09016 (Dec. 18, 
2008), available at http://www.ieer.org/reports/DOE _ WasteContracts20 I 0/09RW09016%20Bell%20Bend.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-192, FURTHER ACTION NEEDED TO BETTER IMPLEMENT 
REQUIREMENTS FOR CONDUCTING INVENTORY OF SERVICE CONTRACT ACTIVITIES (Jan 14, 20 II); Lane v. Celanese 
Corp of Am., 94 F. Supp. 528, 529 (N.D.N.Y. 1950); Redevelopment Agreement between The Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey and the Bayonne Local Redevelopment Authority, Contract for The Peninsula at 
Bayonne Harbor (July 2010) (on file with author); Dixon v. CertainTeed Corp., 944 F. Supp. 1501, 1506 (D. Kan. 
1996). 
6 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
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a fee paid over the course of the entire contract term.7 Simultaneously, the indemnifying party 
takes on the role of the insurer and retains the liability of the contract, presumably in exchange 
for a better contract price or more favorable terms. 8 
To allocate risk in private contracts, parties employ provisions requiring msurance 
covering the terms of the contract as well as indemnification provisions allocating risk through 
the contract terms. In private contracts, indemnification presents little problem, as freedom-of-
contract doctrine includes a right to provide for indemnification.9 In public contracts, however, 
the federal government is subject to unique contractual limitations, one of which restricts the 
means and scope of contractual indemnification in federal government contracts. 10 The 
limitation on the federal government is based on a line of Comptroller General opinions and 
United States Court of Federal Claims cases; all hold that the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits 
indemnification contracts that purport to establish unlimited liability in the federal government. 11 
Though the weight of authority holds that the federal government cannot contractually indemnify 
for an unlimited amount of liability, the government's pattern of conduct in entering 
indemnification agreements warrants a discussion of the law limiting a contractor's ability to 
succeed on a claim for enforcement of such an unlimited indemnification provision.12 
7 Eric F. Herzberg, Is Indemnification a Barrier to Public-Private Partnerships?, LOGISTICS MGMT. INST. (2004), 
http://www.acq.osd.miVlog/mpp/articles/LG301L3%20Hold%20Harmless.pdf (stating that indemoification in 
governmental contracts is, at its core, a tool for risk management and risk allocation). 
8 See id. 
9 Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court oflndus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923) ("Freedom is the general rule, 
and restraint the exception."). 
10 59 Camp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Camp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Camp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Camp. Gen. 507 (1928); 
Indemnification Agreements and the Anti-Deficiency Act, 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 94 (1984); Rick's 
Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. U.S., 76 Fed. Cl. 250 (Fed. Cl. 2007). 
11 59 Camp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Camp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Camp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Camp. Gen. 507 (1928); 
Rick's Mushroom Service, Inc., 76 Fed. Cl. 250. 
12 See Rick's Mushroom Service, Inc., 76 Fed. Cl. 250; Union Pac. R.R. Corp. v. U.S., 52 Fed. Cl. 730 (Fed. Cl. 
2002); see Contract with Duke Energy Corporation; Contract with PPL Bell Bend, LLC, Bell Bend Nuclear Power 
Plant (demonstrating that the federal government still incorporates indemnification provisions in its contracts). 
While govermnental entities have been discouraged from entering contractual indemoity contracts, the necessity of 
the tool has forced the United States Legislature to statutorily permit contractual indemnity in many situations. I 0 
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To succeed on a claim for indenmification from the federal government, a contractor 
must show that: (1) the federal government's sovereign immunity has been waived for 
contractual indemnity claims and (2) that the Anti-Deficiency Act either does not apply to the 
particular claim or should not foreclose indemnification. 13 A contractor can show a waiver of 
sovereign immunity either by pointing to the express terms of the contract or by showing a 
legislative waiver of sovereign immunity. 14 The most sweeping legislative waiver of sovereign 
immunity with regard to enforcing contractual indenmification under federal law is the Tucker 
Act, 15 which provides the United States Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over all claims 
arising under federal contracts, and thus waives sovereign immunity for all such contract 
claims. 16 In order to bring a contractual indemnity claim under the Tucker Act, the contracting 
party need establish only that enforcement of the indemnity provision is contractually based 
rather than based on tort law or some other legal rightY Once a party establishes a waiver of 
sovereign immunity, it must then show that the contractual indemnity provision that it is 
attempting to enforce does not violate the Anti-Deficiency Act. 
To establish that contractual indenmity does not violate the Anti-Deficiency Act, a 
contracting party must show that the indemnification provision establishes a cap on liability for 
which a sufficient appropriation has been made, or that legislation expressly authorizes the 
unlimited indenmification. 18 If the parties have entered into a contract for unlimited indenmity 
U.S.C. § 2354 (2006); 48 C.P.R.§ 950.7101 (West Aprill9, 2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). Even when not 
statutorily permitted, governmental entities occasionally place contractual indemnity clauses in their contracts. Tex. 
& N.O.R. Co. v. Galveston Cnty., 161 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), aff'd, 169 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1943) (the 
county indemnified several railroads for the construction and operation of a drawbridge). 
13 See infra Patt liLA and Patt III.B. 
14 See infra Patt liLA. 
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006) (waiving sovereign immunity for contract claims in excess of$10,000). 
16 28 u.s.c. § 1491 (2006). 
17 Kenney Orthopedic, LLC v. U.S., 83 Fed. Cl. 35 (Fed. Cl. 2008). 
18 Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc., 76 Fed. Cl. 250; 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Comp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Comp. 
Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Comp. Gen. 507 (1928). 
3 
and a party cannot satisfY either of these requirements, the overwhelming weight of authority 
suggests that the provision is unenforceable. 19 If the party, has entered into a contract for 
unlimited indemnity, however, it may still argue that the Anti-Deficiency Act does not restrict 
indemnification contracts because the Anti-Deficiency Act targets definitive liability, rather than 
contingent liability.20 Making such an argument, while supported by the defined language of the 
Anti-Deficiency Act, carries with it a difficult battle against established precedentY 
If a contracting party can demonstrate that the Anti-Deficiency Act does not bar recovery 
for the contractual indemnity provision that the govermnent assumed, and that the federal 
govermnent has waived its sovereign immunity, the claim will proceed as to the extent that a 
private entity in a similar circumstance would be liable. 22 By honoring its contractual 
obligations in this way, the government reinforces the legitimacy and stability of its contracts 
and enables future entities to be confident in entering similar indemnification provisions to 
allocate risk. 23 
This Comment will summarize the applicable law foreclosing the federal govermnent's 
ability to contractually indemnity for unlimited liability, examine the obstacles presented to a 
contractor bringing a claim against the federal government for contractual indemnity, and 
suggest a possible alternative interpretation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, which would increase 
the federal government's flexibility in entering indemnity contracts without relieving Congress 
of the sole power to make appropriations. 
19 See Infra Part III.B. 
20 See Infra Part IV. 
21 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Comp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Comp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Comp. Gen. 507 (1928); 
Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc., 76 Fed. Cl. at 250; Union Pac. R.R. Corp. v. U.S., 52 Fed. Cl. 730,732 (2002). 
22 U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. U.S., 728 F. Supp. 651, 653-54 (D. Utah 1989) ("the extent of the federal waiver is 
measured by assessment of how Utah law would treat 'a private individual in like circumstances."') (citing Ewell v. 
U.S., 579 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Utah 1984)). 
23 Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 467 (1999). 
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Specifically, Part II will summarize contractual indemnification, the Tucker Act, and the 
Anti-Deficiency Act, and analyze how those doctrines apply to the federal government's ability 
to contractually indemnify. Part III will expand upon the Tucker Act and the Anti-Deficiency 
Act and specifically discuss how the Tucker Act establishes a waiver of sovereign immunity for 
claims arising out of contractual indemnity claims but how the Anti-Deficiency Act forecloses 
such indemnity claims through invalidating the terms of many indemnity contracts with the 
federal government. Part IV will discuss the plain language of the Anti-Deficiency Act, suggest 
that the current interpretation may contradict the Comptroller General's own definitions of the 
terms used in the Anti-Deficiency Act and will suggest an alternative approach to regulating the 
federal government's ability to enter indemnification contracts that create unlimited liability. 
Finally, Part V will explain that, while the Comptroller General never should have interpreted the 
Anti-Deficiency Act as foreclosing unlimited contractual indemnity by the federal government, a 
change in policy at this point is highly unlikely and may even be harmful due to the significant 
weight of authority establishing the current interpretation as the law. 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO CONTRACTUALLY INDEMNIFY 
A. Contractual Indemnity 
Contractual indemnity is an agreement to hold harmless or assume another contracting 
party's liability for loss, damage, or harm resulting from the terms of a contract or as a result of 
the fulfillment of that contract. 24 It is an assurance which one party undertakes to shield another 
from anticipated, expected, or possible liability and a way to prevent the other party from 
24 See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (9th Ed. 2009). An indemnity provision is a contractual term that creates a duty to 
"make good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another" or creates a right in a contracting party to claim 
reimbursement for loss, damage, or liability resulting from the terms of that contract. Id 
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suffering the unexpected financial consequences of tort liability. 25 Under a standard 
indemnification contract, the "indemnitor" agrees to bear the risk of loss, reimburse the 
"indemnitee" 26 for all costs resulting from the contract, and assume the responsibility of 
defending any litigation resulting from furtherance ofthe contract.27 
The general rules which govern the creation, interpretation, and application of contracts, 
and the standards by which contractual terms are analyzed and scrutinized, apply similarly to 
interpreting a contract for indemnification. 28 Further, determination of the validity of an 
indemnification contract generally follows the same standards applied to all private contracts. 29 
Where the terms of the indemnity provision are unambiguous, those terms will govem.30 Where, 
however, the terms of the provision or contract are ambiguous, the court will determine the limits 
of the contractual provision based on its interpretation of the intent of the contracting parties.31 
In accordance with general contract principle, private entities may freely enter contracts which 
purport to indemnify, so long as those contracts does not attempt to indemnify a party against 
harm caused due to that party's sole negligence.32 So long as the indemnitee's fault is not solely 
responsible for causing the injury being indemnified, the terms of the indemnification contract 
25 See id 
26 An "indemnitee" is the individual being indemnified against liability. The "indemnitor" is the individual taking on 
liability and holding the indemnitee harmless. Id 
27 Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993). 
28 IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Intern. Partners, LLC., 438 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006). 
29 !d. 
3° Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co., 151 S.W.3d 306 (Ark. 2004). 
31 !d. 
32 Indemnification contracts which purport to indemnify a party for its sole negligence are invalid as against public 
policy. Allowing such a contract provision would allow a party to act negligently or grossly negligent without an 
associated duty to compensate for harm done. See Brown v. Balt. aud Ohio R. Co., 805 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1986); 
Kemira, Inc. v. A-C Compressor Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1059, 1070 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (citing Nat'!. Candy Wholesalers, 
Inc. v. Chipurnoi, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).). 
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can cover all actions resulting from furtherance of the contract or specific action required under 
the contract. 33 
Contractual indemnity is an important tool that allows private entities to allocate the risk 
of a contract to a particular party in exchange for compensation. Parties that may otherwise be 
unable to assume the risk of a large future lawsuit can instead pay a greater price up front or over 
the course of the contract to avoid the possibility of paying a large unknown sum in the future. 
The flexibility and benefit of indenmification has led to its consistent use in a variety of contract 
areas including manufacturing contracts, property acquisition contracts, and construction 
contracts. 34 In these areas indenmification is especially useful due to the high likelihood of harm 
and resultant litigation. Indenmification acts as a form of insurance, allowing the contractors to 
pursue risky contracts without having to set aside large amounts of capital for the possibility of 
future lawsuits. In any indemnification contract, however, one party necessarily must assume 
that underlying risk.35 
In contracts with the federal government, however, private entities are able to take on the 
risk of unlimited loss, while the federal government cannot. 36 The federal government can pay 
upfront for relief from the risk of lawsuit, so long as an adequate appropriation has been made, 
but may not take on the role of the insurer without express statutory authorization. 37 If the 
33 Flynn v. Am. Auto Carriers, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 158, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that federa1law adheres to the 
general contract principle that a party cannot be indemnified for their sole negligence). 
34 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-192, FUR TilER ACTION NEEDED TO BETTER IMPLEMENT 
REQUIREMENTS FOR CONDUCTING INVENTORY OF SERVICE CONTRACT ACTIVITIES (Jan 14, 2011) (showing the 
existence of indemnity provisions in military contracts); Lane v. Celanese Corp of Am., 94 F. Supp. 528, 529 
(N.D.N.Y. 1950) (showing the existence of indemnity provisions in manufacturing contracts); Redevelopment 
Agreement between The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Bayonne Local Redevelopment 
Authority, Contract for The Peninsula at Bayonne Harbor (July 2010) (on file with author) (showing the existence of 
indemnity provisions in property acquisition contracts); Dixon v. CertainTeed Corp., 944 F. Supp. 1501, 1506 (D. 
Kan. 1996) (showing the existence of indemnity provisions in construction contracts). 
35 See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (9th Ed. 2009). 
36 See infra Part III. 
37 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Comp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Comp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Comp. Gen. 507 (1928); 
Indemnification Agreements and the Anti-Deficiency Act, 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 94 (1984). 
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federal government does purport to assume the role of an indemnitor, a private party entering 
such a contract has significant barriers to enforcement of the indemnification terms. 38 
B. Sovereign Immunity and the Tucker Act 
In federal jurisprudence, the doctrine of sovereign immunity stands as the primary barrier 
to a private entity's ability to sue the federal government.39 The doctrine states that an entity 
may not sue the government or governmental agencies unless permission to sue is granted in a 
legislative act. 40 The original foundation of sovereign immunity was based on the divine right of 
kings.41 The theory stated that, as a divine entity, the monarch could commit no wrong, and thus 
subjects of the kingdom had no right to sue him. 42 One of the earlier cases recognizing sovereign 
immunity in the United States was Kawananakoa v. Polybank. 43 Kawananakoa moved the 
doctrine away from its feudal background and established a democratic justification for its use in 
the United States.44 Kawananakoa held that "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of 
any formal conception of obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can 
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. "45 As 
the right evolved, it came to embody the principle that a legal right could exist against the United 
States only if the legislature authorizes such a right. 46 Accordingly, the government is now 
shielded from substantive liability for any legal claim that it has not consented to, but cannot 
38 See infra Part IV. 
39 Robert Porter, Contract Claims Against the Federal Government: Sovereign Immunity and Contractual Remedies, 
(Harv. Law Sch. Fed. Budget Pol'y Seminar, Briefing Paper, 2006). 
40 U.S. v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846). 
41 Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About the Sovereign's Immunity, I Learned 
from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 434 (2005). 
42 Id 
43 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). 
44 Id 
45 Id 
46 Seidman, supra note 36, at 393. 
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claim immunity from suit in areas of law where it has consented to suit.47 When a party fails to 
establish a waiver of sovereign immunity, the substantive law underlying the claim is irrelevant, 
and the suit must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.48 
The reach of sovereign immunity is expansive; however, it is not limitless.49 Where the 
government has consented to suit, it is liable for all claims falling under that consent, as if it were 
acting as a private entity. 50 To establish a lawsuit against the federal government, the party 
bringing suit must be able to point to a statute waiving sovereign immunity for the specific type 
of claim being brought. 51 To establish such a waiver, the text of the statute must contain an 
unequivocally clear statement waiving sovereign immunity. 52 The waiver need not use the 
words "waiver of sovereign immunity" to explicitly constitute an express right to sue, but a party 
cannot base such a waiver solely on implication. 53 As such, the court will strictly construe any 
claimed waiver based on the terms of the statute and will not interpret such a waiver loosely. 54 
The most pertinent legislative enactment, giving rise to a waiver of sovereign immunity 
with respect to the federal government's ability to contractually indemnify, is the Tucker Act. 55 
For some time Congress has understood the necessity of establishing liability for the federal 
government arising out of contract disputes and has waived the government's immunity from 
47 U.S. v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. !56 (1981). 
48 U.S. v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286,288 (1846); U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,586 (1941) ("[T]he terms of[the 
govermnent's] consent to be sued in any court defme that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.") 
49 McLemore, 45 U.S. at 288. 
50 !d. 
51 Taylor v. U.S., 303 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002); U.S. v. King, 395 U.S. I (Ct. Cl. 1969) (stating that the 
Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to provide relief must be based on some area in which the Federal Govermnent 
has waived its sovereign immunity). 
52 Mollison v. U.S., 568 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). 
53 Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assoc., Inc., 86 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Although 
sovereign immunity may not be waived by implication, waiver need not use words "sovereign immunity" to be 
deemed explicit; statutory or contractual creation of right to sue constitutes effective waiver."). 
54 U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill (1979); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) ("[W]aiver of the Federal 
Govermnent's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text. Moreover, a waiver of the 
Govermnent's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign."). 
55 See infra Part liLA. (discussing the Tucker Act and it's legislatively mandated abrogation of sovereign immunity). 
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such claims. 56 This early waiver of sovereign immunity that Congress implicitly established has 
been largely displaced by the Tucker Act. 57 The Tucker Act strips the government of sovereign 
immunity for claims arising out of government contract disputes, so long as the plaintiff meets 
certain criteria and follows certain rules. 58 
The Tucker Act further provides the United States Court of Federal Claims with 
jurisdiction to hear any non-tort claim against the United States, which is founded on any express 
or implied contract with the United States: 59 
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render 
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for 
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 60 
The Act does not explicitly state that it waives sovereign immunity for claims arising out 
of contract disputes, but it has been deemed to do so based on the clear language providing the 
United States Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over such claims.61 Accordingly, the 
Tucker Act permits claims against the federal government for: (1) contractual disputes, (2) 
disputes where the plaintiff seeks reimbursement for money paid to the government, and (3) 
disputes where the plaintiff asserts a right to payment from the government62so long as the basis 
of the claim does not sound in tort. 63 
56 Porter, supra note 34 (stating that the creation of the Court of Claims in 1855 established a waiver of immunity 
for claims based in contract law and was essential to the government's ability to procure necessary goods and 
services through private contractors). 
57 See irifra Part liLA. (discussing the Tucker Act and it's legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity). 
58 Id. 
59 Diversified Carting, Inc. v. N.Y.C., 423 F. Supp. 2d 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
60 The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). 
6t Id. 
"Id. 
63 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b) 
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If a plaintiff can bring a claim under the Tucker Act, sovereign immunity is "simply a 
nonissue" and will not restrict the claim from moving forward. 64 The Tucker Act is quite broad 
and does not simply cover procurement contracts for goods, lands, and services, but extends to 
claims based on any "agreement undertaken by the federal government that has a private 
analogue, that is, categorically of the sort that can be executed among private entities and 
individuals." 65 As such, it should encompass claims for enforcement of indemnification 
provisions in federal contracts and any party bringing a claim for indemnity likely will not 
encounter a significant challenge to the waiver of sovereign immunity. 
While the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for most contract claims, it does not 
fully dispense with the government's sovereign immunity associated with contract claims, 
instead, it retains significant limitations on a party's ability to sue. 66 Included in these limitations 
are a variety of rules, such as pre-suit notice, which a party must follow in order to pursue a 
contract-based suit against the federal government.67 If any of the standards that the Tucker Act 
establishes is not strictly followed, jurisdiction fails, and the claim will be dismissed as if the 
federal government had never consented to suit. 68 Any party seeking to bring a claim for 
contractual indemnity against the federal government should fully review the restrictions set 
forth in the Tucker Act before proceeding with such a claim. If a party adheres to all of the 
standards and rules that the Tucker Act establishes, that party may still pursue a contractual 
64 Wesreco, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 618 F. Supp. 562 (D.C. Utah 1985) (stating that when a plaintiff asserts a 
claim for damage against the United States which falls within the purview of the Tucker Act, determining consent to 
suit is a nonissue ). 
65 Stovall v. U.S., 71 Fed. Cl. 696 (Fed. Cl. 2006). 
66 28 u.s.c. § 1491. 
67 !d. 
68 !d. Under the Tucker Act, waivers of sovereign immunity are limited to cases in which the damages sought are 
greater than $10,000, the plaintiff brings the action in the Court of Federal Claims, and the plaintiff may only seek 
monetary damages. !d. 
11 
claim against the federal govermnent only if the contract it is seeking to enforce is valid and 
binding on the federal govermnent. 69 
C. The Federal Anti-Deficiency Act 
The major statutory bar to a contractual indemnification claim against the federal 
govermnent is the Anti-Deficiency Act, which "bars a federal employee or agency from entering 
into a contract for future payment of money in advance of or in excess of an existing 
appropriation." 70 The Anti-Deficiency Act is not limited to any one branch of the federal 
govermnent, but applies to all officers, agencies, and employees with the authority to enter 
contracts on behalf of the United States. 71 While private parties are free to allocate risk of loss 
through contract provision, the federal govermnent does not have such a right, partially based on 
the restrictions set forth in the Anti-Deficiency Act.72 
"The Anti-Deficiency Act was born as a result of congressional frustration at the constant 
parade of deficiency requests for appropriations it was receiving in the nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century, generated, it believed, by the lack of foresight and careful husbanding of 
funds by executive branch agencies." 73 The animating view was that the executive branch 
simply ignored the Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution and consistently 
69 Barron v. McKinnon, 196 F. 933, 938 (1st Cir. 1912). 
70 Hercules Inc. v. U.S., 516 U.S. 417,427 (1996). 
71 Because the Anti-Deficiency Act applies to all branches ofthe federal government and all agencies, an 
interpretation that it restricts contractual indemnity forecloses the ability of all federal agencies to contractually 
indemni:ty. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Agencies that are typically involved in high-risk contracts, however, often have 
express legislative authorization to enter such indemnification contracts. 10 U.S.C. § 2354 (research and 
development of military departments); National Defense Contracts Act, Pub. L. No. 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (1958); 42 
U.S.C. § 241 (Department of Health and Human Services Contracts for Research and Investigation); Price-Anderson 
Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210. 
72 Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court oflndus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923) ("Freedom is the general rule, 
and restraint the exception."); see infra Part III.B. 
73 59 Comp. Gen. 369, 372 (1980) WL 17997 (Comp.Gen.) (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONG., 350-375 (1809)). 
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entered contracts without sufficient forethought or appropriate planning. 74 The Appropriations 
Clause states that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law"; by entering contracts for which no appropriation had been 
made, the executive branch was circumventing this Clause75 since 
Congress consistently make additional appropriations to pay for deficiencies in contracts 
already entered. 76 To halt this practice, the Anti-Deficiency Act established Congress's 
supremacy in determining and facilitating the budget and enforcing the Appropriations Clause of 
the United States Constitution.77 It established a means by which the legislature could restrict 
government agencies from seeking additional appropriations to pay for deficiencies resulting 
from improper oversight in contracts. 78 
The Anti-Deficiency Act states: 
An officer or employee of the United States Government ... may not 
(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount 
available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; or 
(B) involve either the government in a contract or obligation for the 
payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by 
law.79 
It prohibits (I) making any expenditure or obligation in excess of an available appropriation as 
well as (2) making any expenditure or obligation in advance of an available appropriation.80 It 
forecloses a government agent's ability to rely on future appropriations to cover current 
obligations. Additionally, because the Anti-Deficiency Act specifically refers to "available 
74 Manos, The Antideficiency Act Without an M Account: Reasserting Constitutional Control, 23 PUB. CONTR. L.J. 
337, 339 (Spring 1994) (stating that the Anti-Deficiency Act was a means of stopping the executive branch of the 
federal government from refusing to comply with the Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution). 
75 U.S. CONST., art. !, § 9 cl. 7. 
76 Manos, supra note 61 at 339 (citing J. SHERMAN, RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND 
CABINENT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 155 (1895). 
77 Manos, supra note 61 at 339 (stating that the Anti-Deficiency Act was enacted to foreclose executive agencies 
from complying with congressional appropriation restrictions). 
78 59 Comp. Gen. 369, 372, (1980); see 4 ANNALS OF CONG., 350-375 (1809). 
79 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (a)(!) (2006). 
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appropriations," it contemplates not only appropriations that are insufficient at the time the 
contract is entered, but also depletion of appropriations.81 If depletion of an appropriation occurs 
to a point where sufficient funds no longer exist for payment of a contract, no further payment of 
money may be authorized or can be made in association with such a contract or obligation. 82 
The settled policy is to keep the expenditures of each agency within the appropriations 
made by Congress each year for conducting its affairs. 83 This ensures that the "Powers of the 
Purse" remain with Congress, and limits a government agency's ability to spend money without 
the consent of Congress. 84 Any contract for which Congress has not consented - and thus there 
is not a sufficient appropriation to cover its completion - is deemed ultra vires, as a violation of 
the Anti-Deficiency Act. 85 When a governmental agent attempts to spend an amount in excess of 
what Congress has set aside in an appropriation for a particular contract, the Anti-Deficiency Act 
is triggered to disallow such an agreement. 86 A daunting example of such a violation occurred 
when the Department of the Army over-obligated and overspent nearly $160 million on 
government contracts and had to stop payment to approximately 900 contractors.87 
If a government agent employs a party properly, however, that party may be able to 
recover for services provided even if the appropriation is exhausted. 88 If Congress agrees to such 
payment, but, since congressional consent is required, such payment is in no way guaranteed. 89 
81 See generally id 
82 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-RB, pt. C, s. 2 WL 6179172, 0BL!GATlON/EXPENDlTURE IN EXCESS 
OR ADVANCE OF APPROPRIATIONS (2006). 
83 Parshall v. U.S., 147 F. 433 (8th Cir. 1906); Sutton v. U.S. 256 U.S. 575 (1921). 
84 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 7. 
85 Appeals of National Gypsum Co., ASBCA No. 53259, 03-1 B.C.A.1]32,054 (2002). 
86 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-RB, pt. C, s. 2 WL 6179172, OBLlGATlON/EXPENDITURE IN EXCESS 
ORADVANCEOF APPROPRIATIONS (2006). 
87 55 Comp. Gen. 768 (1976). 
88 King v. U.S. I Ct. Cl. 38 (Ct. Cl. 1863); Shipman v. U.S., 18 Ct. Cl. 138 (Ct. Cl. 1883) (stating that if a 
government agent is given authority to contract for specific work without limitation as to how that work is done, or 
the cost ofthat work, the contracts which that agent makes are binding on the government, regardless of whether 
money has been appropriated for the particular purpose). 
89 King I Ct. Cl. at 38; Shipman 18 Ct. Cl at 138. 
14 
Once an appropriation is depleted, a contractor may be required to stop the work it was 
contracted to perform, but that insufficiency in the appropriation "does not pay the Government's 
debts, nor cancel its obligations, nor defeat the rights of other parties."90 Regardless of the 
general statement in Ferris v United States that a contractor should be paid under the terms of its 
contract regardless of the depletion of an associated appropriation, a contractor's ability to be 
paid for the completion of a contract that violates the Anti-Deficiency Act depends largely on the 
contractor's knowledge of the government's spending limitations under the appropriation.91 As 
such, in any contractual indemnification provision, the party attempting to enforce the 
indemnification provision must continually be cognizant of the financial limitations placed on 
the federal government. 
If the contractor has knowledge of the spending limitation that the federal government 
exceeds, the contractor cannot receive payment for any work completed.92 If, however, the party 
can show that it did not have notice, nor should have had notice of the government's spending 
limitations, then it will not be able to continue working but will be paid for work completed. 93 
One way to prove such a lack of notice is to show a division of the appropriation fund between 
multiple different contractors, and in turn show that the contractor could not have known the 
limited amount authorized for its portion of the contract. 94 In such a case, the contractor may be 
paid for the work it has completed, but the contract will be cancelled moving forward. 95 Because 
the funds are insufficient to pay for work already completed, the governmental agency that 
entered the contract must transfer funds from other appropriations, if authorized to do so, seek a 
9
° Ferris v. U.S., 27 Ct. Cl. 542, 546 (Ct. Cl. 1892). 
91 Sutton v. U.S., 256 U.S. 575 (1921). 
92 Id 
93 Ferris 27 Ct. Cl. at 542. 
94 Id 
95 Id 
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deficiency and supplemental appropriations from Congress, or discontinue the service of the 
contract altogether and pay the debt already accrued.96 
At any rate, the Anti-Deficiency Act, as interpreted by the weight of authority, bars 
contractual indenmification for an unlimited amount.97 Even in cases oflimited indenmification, 
however, the party attempting to enforce indenmification should be wary of depleting the 
appropriation set aside for its valid contract. 
III. APPLICATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE ANTI-
DEFICIENCY ACT TO CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY 
In order for a contractor to bring a claim against the federal government to enforce an 
indemnification provision entered by the federal government, that contractor must establish both 
(1) that the federal government has waived its sovereign immunity and legislatively consented to 
suit associated with the contractual indenmity, and (2) that the federal government had a 
legislatively mandated right to enter the indemnification contract in the first place. As discussed 
earlier in Part II.B., in contractual indenmity claims, as in all claims against the federal 
government, the contracting party must first found its claim on an act of the legislature that 
explicitly waives sovereign immunity for such claims.98 Once a party establishes a waiver of 
sovereign immunity, it must then show that the federal government has a right to enter the 
contract by establishing that the contractual provision does not violate any statutory restrictions 
placed on government contracts. 99 Specifically with indenmification contracts, the contractor 
96 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-RB, pt. C, s. 2 WL 6179172, OBLIGATION/EXPENDITURE IN EXCESS 
OR ADVANCE OF APPROPRIATIONS (2006). 
97 See, e.g., 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Comp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Comp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Comp. Gen. 507 
(1928); Rick's Mushroom Service, Inc., 76 Fed. Cl. 250; Union Pac. R.R. Corp. v. U.S., 52 Fed. Cl. 730, 732 
(2002). 
98 See supra Part II.B. 
99 See supra Part II. C. 
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must establish that the contract does not violate the Anti-Deficiency Act. 100 If the 
indemnification provision purports to provide unlimited indemnity by the federal government, 
the contractor has a difficult path and must contradict a long line of case law and Comptroller 
General opinions holding that such contracts are unenforceable. 101 
A. The Federal Government has Waived its Sovereign Immunity for Claims Arising 
Out of Contractual Indemnity 
In order to establish a claim for contractual indemnity against the federal government, a 
party must clearly establish a waiver of sovereign immunity associated with the contract. 102 A 
contractor may show an implied waiver of sovereign immunity through entering a contract or an 
express waiver of sovereign immunity through pointing to legislation that specifically waives 
immunity for contract claims. While state law suggests that the federal government waives its 
sovereign immunity by validly entering contracts, under federal law the most likely source of a 
waiver is the Tucker Act. 103 
A party seeking to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity may point to the terms of the 
contractual indemnity provision and argue that, by entering a contract with such a provision, the 
federal government impliedly consented to suit. This line of reasoning is supported by state law, 
but lacks similar support in federal jurisdictions. 104 Such a claim fails in federal jurisdictions 
100 /d. 
101 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Comp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Comp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Comp. Gen. 507 (1928). 
102 U.S. v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846). 
103 The Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C.§ 1491 (2006). 
104 State Bd. of Pub. Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp., 542 P.2d 503,506 (Okla. 1975) (holding that when a party 
enters a valid contract with the State and a valid appropriation has been made, the State inherently waives its 
sovereign immunity with regard to the contract obligations); Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 370 P.2d 
338, 339 (Cal. 1962) ("[W]hen the state makes a contract with an individual it is liable for a breach of its agreement 
in like manner as an individual, and the doctrine of governmental immunity does not apply."); George & Lynch, Inc. 
v. State, 197 A.2d 734, 737 (Del. 1964) (stating that a party that contracts with an agency which is authorized to 
enter contracts has all the same remedies under the contract that a private citizen would have against another private 
citizen); Kersten Co. v. Dep 't of Social Serv., 207 N. W.2d 117, 120 (Iowa 1973) ("By entering into a contract, [a 
state] agrees to be answerable for its breach and waives its immunity from suit."); J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 494 N.E.2d 374 (Mass. 1986) (stating that a state consents to jurisdiction and thus lawsuit by 
voluntarily entering a contract). 
17 
because, under federal law, any party contracting with the government is deemed to implicitly 
have knowledge of the government contract limitations regardless of the party's actual 
knowledge.105 Accordingly, seeking a waiver of immunity through the express terms of a federal 
contract is futile. 
Similarly, if a contractor enters an otherwise valid contract with the federal government, 
for which there is no waiver of sovereign immunity, the injured contractor may claim that the 
federal government is equitably estopped from denying the validity of its contract. 106 In order to 
establish equitable estoppel a party must show four elements: "(1) [the defendant] asserted a 
position by conduct or words; (2) [the injured party] acted in reasonable reliance on the 
[defendant's] assertion; (3) [the injured party) suffered resulting [in] prejudice; and (4) estopping 
the [defendant) from acting against [the injured party's interests] serves the interest of justice so 
as to limit public injury."107 If the party is deemed as having notice of the government's contract 
limitations, it can never reasonably rely on a position asserted by the federal government that 
ignores such limitations. Thus, equitable estoppel carmot defeat sovereign immunity because an 
element of the equitable estoppels claim will always be missing in such federal claims. While 
this result may be contrary to the expectations of a party entering an indemnification contract, 
the indemnity term, on its own, carmot establish the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity or a 
claim for equitable estoppel. 
Nevertheless, although a party may not be able to establish a wruver of sovereign 
immunity based merely on the terms of the contract itself, it will likely be able to show that the 
Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for claims based on contractual indemnification disputes. 
105 Lopez v. Johns Manville, 649 F. Supp. 149, 157-58 (1986). 
106 See Hidden Heights Assisted Living, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Health & Soc. Serv., Div. of Health Care Services, 
222 P.3d 258, 268 (Alaska 2009). 
107 Hidden Heights Assisted Living, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv., Div. of Health Care Services, 222 
P.3d 258, 268 (Alaska 2009). 
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As stated previously, the Tucker Act provides the United States Court of Federal Claims with 
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases resulting from contract disputes with the federal govermnent. 108 
In order to establish that such a waiver of sovereign immunity covers a claim to enforce 
an indenmification provision, the party asserting the claim must show that contract law 
establishes the right to enforce an indemnity contract. 109 The Tucker Act does not authorize 
lawsuits sounding in contract, but based on other rights, and these actions are not authorized 
simply by framing an action in contract terms.uo Similarly, a claim for indenmification may be 
framed in tort terms by stating that the underlying cause of action necessitating indemnification 
is tort-based; however such an argument does not recognize the very nature of a claim to enforce 
indenmification. Unlike claims, such as tortious interference, which pertain to contracts but are 
based in tort law, a claim for contractual indemnity is based on a contractual right and only 
secondarily concerned with the underlying tort action for which indenmification is being 
sought. 111 Framing the claim as a tort action cannot change the fact that the claim for 
indemnification is, at its core, a contract claim with antecedents of a tort action. 112 Because it is 
relatively easy to establish that claims to enforce contractual indemnity are contract-based, the 
govermnent's ability to establish immunity from the underlying tort is irrelevant.m As claims 
based on contractual indenmity are clearly contract-based, the Tucker Act waives sovereign 
immunity from such claims so long as the contract was entered validlyY4 If an agency of the 
United States, acting with authority to do so, enters into an agreement and binds the United 
108 The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). 
109 See id 
110 Ribas y Hijo v. U.S., 195 U.S. 315 (1904); New Or1eans-Belize Royal Mail and Cert. Am. S.S. Co. v. U.S., 239 
u.s. 202 (1915). 
"'See Kenney Orthopedic, LLC v. U.S., 83 Fed. Cl. 35 (Fed. Cl. 2008) (stating that the Court of Federal Claims 
lacks jurisdiction over a govermnent contractor's claims of tortious interference which is only associated with the 
contract because the contracting agency's alleged actions did not breach any duty established by the contract). 
"
2 Angel v. Seattle-First Nat'! Bank, 653 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1981). 
mId 
"
4 28 u.s.c. § 1491 (2006). 
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States to that agreement, the sovereign immunity of the United States will be deemed waived for 
the terms of that contract. 115 If, however, an agent does not have authority to enter such a 
contract, the federal government cannot be made liable for such a contract regardless of the 
expectations of the parties. 116 
B. The Anti-Deficiency Act Bars Enforcement of Contract Claims for Unlimited 
Indemnity. 
Once a party establishes jurisdiction for a contract claim based on a waiver of sovereign 
immunity, it must next establish that the government agency had legislative authority to enter the 
contract that the contractor is attempting to enforce. 117 The major bar to enforcement of a 
contract for indemnification in which the federal government is the indemnitor, is the Anti-
Deficiency Act. As stated earlier, the express language of the Anti-Deficiency Act restricts a 
government actor from 
(A) mak[ing] or authorize[ing] an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount 
available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; or (B) 
involv[ing] [the] government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money 
before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law. 118 
Accordingly, "the Supreme Court of the United States and other federal courts have ... held that 
all contracts for future payments of money, in advance of or in excess of existing appropriations, 
"d b . . . ,119 are vm a Imtto. 
Applying this principle to contractual indemnification, the Office of Legal Counsel in the 
U.S. Department of Justice, stated that "[i]n order to comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act, ... 
indemnification agreements with government contractors . . . must include a limitation on the 
115 Porter v. U.S., 496 F.2d 583, (Ct. Cl. 1974). 
116 Pulaski Cab Co. v. U.S., !57 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 
117 Barron v. McKinnon, 196 F. 933, 938 (1st Cir. 1912) ("We understand that the doctrine of ultra vires rests upon 
the principle that on grounds of public policy the courts will not enforce an illegal or an ultra vires contract .... "). 
118 Union Pac. R.R. Corp. v. U.S., 52 Fed. Cl. 730, 732 (2002). 
119 Williams v. D.C., 902 A.2d 91, 94 (D.C. 2006) (citing Hercules. Inc. 516 U.S. at 427). 
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amount of liability ... " that the federal government assumes.120 This limitation can come in the 
form of a cap on the maximum amount indemnified, or through a general statement that the 
indemnification clause caunot provide a contractor with indemnification beyond the amount of 
money that Congress has appropriated for such a contract. 121 
The requirement that the contract place a cap on liability stems from the Comptroller 
General's interpretation that no officer of the federal government has the right to make any 
contract on behalf of the federal government that involves payment of an indefinite or uncertain 
sum and thus may exceed the appropriation set aside for the contract. 122 The Comptroller argued 
that, if it allows contractual indemnification without the requisite cap on liability, the federal 
government could enter contracts subject to unlimited liability and thus possibly insufficient 
appropriations. 123 The Comptroller General further contends that it is impossible to appropriate 
enough money to cover a contract that creates the possibility of unlimited liability, and thus any 
such contract violates the Anti-Deficiency Act. 124 This position is supported by Comptroller 
General opinions dating back to 1928,125 by the Department of Justice, 126 and by the United 
States Court of Federal Claims in Rick's Mushroom Service, Inc. v. United States127 and Union 
Pacific Rail Road Corporporation v. United States, 128 and has been used to invalidate 
120 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 94, Indemnification Agreements and the Anti-Deficiency Act (1984). 
121 Id 
122 15 Comp. Dec., 405, 407 (1909). 
123 62 Comp. Gen. 366-67 (!983). The interpretation does not contemplate the argument that the Anti-Deficiency 
Act does not apply to contingent liabilities. See irifra Part IV. 
124 62 Comp. Gen. 366-67 (1983). The interpretation does not contemplate the argument that the Anti-Deficiency 
Act does not apply to contingent liabilities. See Part IV. 
125 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Comp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Comp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Comp. Gen. 507 (1928). 
126 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 94, Indemnification Agreements and the Anti-Deficiency Act (1984). 
127 76 Fed. Cl. 250 (2007), affd, 521 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
128 Union Pac. R.R. Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. at 732. 
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government contracts and contracts implied-in-law that purported to indemnify government 
contractors from unlimited liability. 129 
In an early opinion interpreting the Anti-Deficiency Act, the Comptroller General stated 
that any lease agreement which obligates the federal government to indemnify a lessor is, "in the 
absence of express statutory authority, contrary to" the Anti-Deficiency Act. 130 The Comptroller 
General did not further explain this determination, but concluded that unlimited indemnification 
provisions cannot impose a legal obligation upon the federal government because they violate 
the Anti-Deficiency Act. 131 
The Department of Justice expanded upon the Comptroller General's opinion in a 
memorandum opinion advising the Director of the Bureau of Prisons on the legal risks 
associated with entering indemnification contracts.132 In that opinion, the Department of Justice 
explained that, according to a long series of opinions issued by the Comptroller General, 
indemnification contracts violate the Anti-Deficiency Act when they created indefinite, 
indeterminable, or potentially unlimited liability for the federal government. 133 The Department 
of Justice explained that a contract for indemnity without a cap subjects the federal government 
to unlimited liability for which a proper appropriation can never be made. 134 Accordingly, the 
Comptroller General has upheld indemnity contracts only where those contracts limit the federal 
government's liability to an amount set aside in a reserve fund, or where the indemnity contract 
is limited to the amount set aside in the original appropriation. 135 Following the Comptroller 
General opinions, the Department of Justice concluded that indemnification contracts do not 
129 35 Comp. Gen. 85, 87 (1955). 
130 35 Comp. Gen. 85, 85 (1955). 
131 Id. at 85. 
132 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel94 Indemnification Agreements and the Anti-Deficiency Act (1984). 
133 I d. at 96. 
134/d. 
mId. 
22 
violated the Anti-Deficiency Act. 143 Mirroring the line of Comptroller General opinions, the 
Court of Federal Claims held that where an indemnification contract creates open-ended liability, 
or liability for which it is impossible to ascertain whether existing appropriations would cover 
resultant litigation, it violates the Anti-Deficiency Act. 144 
The Comptroller General, Department of Justice, and the court in Union Pacific Rail 
Road make clear that the federal government cannot contractually indemnity for an unlimited 
and unascertainable amount of liability. 145 Any contract in which the federal government 
purports to indemnify for an unlimited amount will be deemed void, as violating the Anti-
Deficiency Act. 146 As such, parties contracting with the federal government should be well 
aware of these limitations and contract accordingly. If a contractor finds itself in the situation 
where it has entered a contract for unlimited indemnification from the federal government, its 
only option is to argue that the Anti-Deficiency Act has been incorrectly interpreted. This 
argument is difficult, as the authority over the past sixty years suggests, but it is not impossible. 
IV. A CONTRADICTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-DEFICIENCY 
ACT AND CONTINGENT LIABILITY 
While virtually all authority holds that the Anti-Deficiency Act makes unlimited 
indemnification contracts by the federal government ultra vires, a review of the underlying 
language in the Anti-Deficiency Act and the definitions applied to that language by the 
Comptroller General suggests a possible alternative interpretation. This interpretation suggests 
that the Anti-Deficiency Act does not foreclose unlimited indemnification contracts because it 
was never intended to restrict contingent liabilities, but only applies to definite obligations. 
143 Id 
144 Id at 735. 
145 See e.g., 35 Cornp. Gen. 85, 85 (1955); 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel94 Indemnification Agreements and the 
Anti-Deficiency Act (1984); Union Pac. R.R. Corp. 52 Fed. Cl. 730. 
146 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel94, Indemnification Agreements and the Anti-Deficiency Act (1984). 
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From the outset, it is clear that "no statute expressly prohibits the execution of indemnity 
agreements on behalf of the United States. Nor does [the Appropriations Clause] ... [f]oreclose 
the government from entering into such contracts. 147 As summarized above, however, the United 
States Court of Federal Claims, the Comptroller General, and the Attorney General have all 
interpreted section (a)(l) of the Anti-Deficiency Act148 as doing so. 149 
The express terms of Section (a)(l) of the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibit employees of the 
United States from authorizing "an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in 
an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation." 150 The general function of the 
provision is to restrict government entities or agents from entering contracts for which sufficient 
funding does not yet exist or will never exist.151 Under the Court of Federal Claims' reading of 
the clear language of the statute, the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits government entities from 
agreeing to indemnify because doing so would necessarily subject it to the possibility of 
unlimited liability. 152 If the language is clear, as the Court of Federal Claims suggests, the 
inquiry ends there. 153 If, however, a party seeking indemnification can successfully establish that 
the language of the Anti-Deficiency Act does not unequivocally show the legislature's intent as 
applied to contractual indemnity, the court will look to other sources to give meaning to the 
147 Id (citing Cincinnati Soap Co. v. U.S., 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937)). 
148 Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l) (2006). 
149 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Comp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Comp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Comp. Gen. 507 (1928); 
Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc., 76 Fed. Cl. 250; Union Pac. R.R. Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. at 732. 
150 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l). 
151 59 Comp. Gen. 369, 372, (1980). 
152 62 Comp. Gen. 366-67 (1983). 
153 U.S. v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2000). 
154 Id 
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One particularly beneficial source to contractors claiming contractual indemnification is 
the Comptroller General's own definition of terms used in the Anti-Deficiency Act. 155 In an 
opinion interpreting the Anti-Deficiency Act, and thereby validating an argument that the 
language in the Anti-Deficiency Act is ambiguous, the Comptroller General defined the meaning 
of the words "expenditure" and "obligation" in advance of appropriations.156 In the opinion, the 
Comptroller General first defined "expenditure" as the liabilities that are currently due or 
payable by the federal government and those that the federal government has paid in the past.157 
As defined, expenditures include things such as payments made for contracts already completed 
or payments not yet made but required by a contract already completed. Because expenditures 
require liability currently due or payable, t a contract for indemnification, which requires no 
payment at the time of enactment and may never require payment, cannot be deemed an 
expenditure under the Comptroller General's definition. 
Next, and more enlightening to this inquiry, the Comptroller General defined the term 
"obligation" as a "definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for the 
payment of appropriated funds for goods and services ordered and received .... "158 By the 
Comptroller General's own admission, an obligation refers only to a "definite commitment" to 
payment, rather than a contingent liability where there is uncertainty as to the eventual existence 
of any liability or payment of funds. 159 The phrase "definite commitment" as used in the 
definition of the term "obligation," includes both matured and un-matured legal liabilities to 
pay, 160 but does not include liabilities which are contingent on some tolling event. 161 A matured 
155 See 31 U.S. C.§ 1341(a}(l). 
156 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l). 
157 See Manos, supra note 74, at 341 n.18. 
158 See Manos, supra note 74, at 356 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS, 1-6, 6-9, (2d ed., Dec. 1992)). (Emphasis added) 
l59ld 
16o Id 
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legal obligation is a liability which is currently payable and due for the individual who has 
contracted for that obligation.162 An example of a matured legal obligation is a bill for services 
already rendered and requiring immediate payment. As such, a matured legal obligation may 
overlap in some respects with the Comptroller General's definition of expenditure. An un-
matured legal obligation, in contrast, is one "which is not yet payable but for which a definite 
liability to pay nevertheless exists." 163 An example of an un-matured liability would be a 
guaranteed payment on a loan, which is not yet immediately due. 
In contrast to a definite liability encompassed by the terms "expenditure" and 
"obligation," a contingent liability is a liability that is not "now fixed and absolute, but which 
will become so in case of the occurrence of some future and uncertain event." 164 "The 
uncertainty as to whether there will be a legal liability differentiates a contingent [liability] from 
an actualliability."165 The contingent liability "only becomes an 'obligation incurred' when the 
contingency materializes or when 'it is probable that a liability will be incurred and its amount 
reasonably estimated. "'166 On the contrary, a definite liability becomes an obligation incurred as 
soon as the contract is entered. 167 
Following this logic, with respect to contractual indenmification, a strong case can be 
made that the obligation incurred by the indemnitor is a contingent liability and thus not an 
"obligation" encompassed by the Anti-Deficiency Act. If the Anti-Deficiency Act restricts the 
federal government only from entering obligations, and by its definition, an obligation includes 
161 Id 
162 Id 
163 Id 
164 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
165 AF Regulation 170-13, Accounting for Commitments, 26 (1982). 
166 See Manos, supra note 74, at 363 (Spring 1994); 62 Comp. Gen. 143, 146. 
167 See id. 
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only definite commitments that create liability, then contingent liabilities, such as contractual 
indemnity, 168 are not foreclosed by the Anti-Deficiency Act. 
Under this line of reasoning, a contingent liability removes contractual indemnity 
entirely from the reach of the Anti-Deficiency Act and allows a party to validly enter a contract 
for unlimited indemnity with the federal government. Simply put, a review of the Comptroller 
General's definition of the words used in the Anti-Deficiency Act, at least shows the ambiguity 
of applying the Anti-Deficiency Act to contractual indemnification, if it does not completely 
dispense the present application of the Anti-Deficiency Act to indemnification. The Anti-
Deficiency Act prohibits officers of the United States Government from making any expenditure 
or obligation in excess or advance of available appropriations, 169 but under this reasoning it may 
not restrict the federal government's use of contractual indemnification. In other contexts, courts 
have interpreted the Anti-Deficiency Act so as not to foreclose contractual provisions which 
expand liability under a contract, and the possibility exists that a similar reading will allow 
contracting parties to contend that it likewise does not foreclose contractual indemnification.170 
Because the significant weight of authority suggests that the Anti-Deficiency Act bars unlimited 
contractual indemnity by the federal government, a party attempting such an argument may not 
find great success. If a contract has already been entered with the federal government for 
unlimited indemnity, however, an attempt at modifying the current state of the law is warranted, 
if not necessary. 
168 Stephen D. Hedlund, Government Contract Contingent Liabilities, The Anti-Deficiency Act, and The Hobgoblin 
of Little Minds, (September 30, 1984) (unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, George Washington University) (on file 
with author). 
169 Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 134l(a)(1) (2006). 
170 18 Comp. Gen. 285 (1938). See infra part IV C. 
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C. Applying the "Reasonably Requisite to the Accomplishment of the 
Appropriation" Standard to Contractual Indemnity 
To attempt a modification of the current policy and standard of disallowing the federal 
government to contractually indemnify for unlimited liability, a party may have to provide a 
governing framework to further public policy and limit abuse of contractual indemnity in a way 
similar to how the Anti-Deficiency Act currently limits abuse. One such standard has been 
applied by the Comptroller General to contracts that allow for increases in the cost of performing 
the contract that could arguably violate the Anti-Deficiency Act-- the "Reasonably Requisite to 
the Accomplishment of the Appropriation" standard. 171 Such a standard could increase the 
flexibility of allowing indemnity while ensuring proper parenting of federal funds. 
The "Reasonably Requisite to the Accomplishment of the Appropriation" standard posits 
that the federal government may enter contracts with contingent liabilities so long as those 
provisions are reasonably requisite to the accomplishment of the original Congressional 
appropriation. 172 Applying this standard, the federal government could enter contracts for 
unlimited liability only if unlimited indemnification was within the bounds of the original 
appropriation authorized by Congress and necessary for the completion of the contract. 173 
Congress would retain control over the appropriations, but government agents would receive 
additional latitude to indemnify when reasonably necessary. It would allow the power of the 
purse to remain with Congress, but provide the government agencies with additional flexibility 
when necessary. 
171 The Reasonably Requisite to the Accomplishment of the Appropriation standard is currently applied to federal 
contracts involving contingent liabilities that have the possibility of increasing the cost of any government contract, 
and could aptly apply to indemnification as well. 18 Comp. Gen. 285 (1938). 
172 18 Comp. Gen. 285 (1938) (stating that contract provisions which may increase the cost of performance of a 
contract are only appropriate if they are reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the appropriation 
authorized by statute). 
173 ld 
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The standard is an iteration of the necessary expense rule which is applied to government 
contracts in order to determine whether an expense entered into by a government agent is 
appropriately associated with the original appropriation. 174 Where Congress makes an 
appropriation for a particular project, that appropriation gives the authority to incur "expenses 
which are necessary or proper or incident to the proper execution" of that project.175 A similar 
application to contractual indenmification provisions would allow the federal government an 
ability to enter indenmification contracts, so long as indemnification was reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the appropriation. Though at first glance it seems that such a standard 
would give the government agent undue leeway to enter any indenmification contract, such a 
standard would allow significant oversight by the legislature. Rather than creating situations 
where government agents enter contractual indemnity provisions and the contracting party is left 
without recourse, this standard would allow the legislature to reprimand the agency, while still 
allowing the contractor to receive the benefit of its bargain in the contract. 
The end result of applying such a standard would be to increase the flexibility of 
contractual indenmity by allowing the federal government to enter contracts for indenmification 
so long as (1) the contract contains a cap on the governments liability, (2) the contractual 
indenmification is statutorily authorized, or (3) the contractual indenmity is reasonably required 
to accomplish the purpose of the appropriation. 176 While such a standard would obviously 
encounter opposition, a review of its application pertaining to other government contracts 
demonstrates its possible success. 
174 Hedlund, supra note 143, at 39. 
175 6 Comp. Gen. 285, 295 (1938). 
176 18 Comp. Gen. 285 (1938). 
30 
V. CONCLUSION 
Over the past sixty years the Comptroller General, the Department of Justice, and the 
United States Court of Federal Claims have interpreted the Anti-Deficiency Act as foreclosing 
indemnification contracts entered by the federal govermnent that purport to create unlimited 
liability for the federal govermnent. 177 Any party entering such a contract with the federal 
govermnent runs the risk of not obtaining the benefit of its bargain unless it can prove that the 
indemnification provision does not violate the Anti-Deficiency Act. To satisfY the Anti-
Deficiency Act, the indemnification provision for unlimited liability must either be legislatively 
authorized or contain a cap on the amount of liability that the federal govermnent assumes. 178 
The Anti-Deficiency Act establishes Congress's power of the purse, but may unduly 
restrict a govermnent agent's ability to contract. Indemnification contracts benefit all parties by 
allowing the allocation of risk in exchange for compensation; however the Anti-Deficiency Act 
restricts the federal govermnent from receiving such benefit. The standard set forth by the Anti-
Deficiency Act in foreclosing the federal govermnent's ability to indemnity for unlimited 
amounts stifles the federal govermnent' s ability to contract without sufficient justification. 
Private entities are able to contract for unlimited indemnification; however, the legislature 
doesn't trust its govermnent agents to have a similar power. 
The Anti-Deficiency Act was born out of a time when the executive branch consistently 
made obligations that weren't sufficiently supported by appropriations. 179 It was a response to a 
proven distrust, and Congress should now reconsider the rule as the federal govermnent has more 
fully established appropriate accounting principles and general oversight procedures. Although 
177 See. e.g., 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980); 35 Comp. Gen. 85 (1955); 16 Comp. Gen. 803 (1937); 7 Comp. Gen. 507 
(1928); Rick's Mushroom Service. Inc., 76 Fed. Cl. 250; Union Pac. R.R. Corp. v. U.S., 52 Fed. Cl. 730, 732 
(2002). 
178 See supra Part III.B. 
179 See supra Part II.B. 
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the weight of authority suggests otherwise, alternative standards may allow the federal 
government more flexibility in contracting while ultimately leaving the power of the purse with 
the legislature. As the federal government increases the contracts it must necessarily enter with 
private entities, the need for an ability to indemnifY increases. A lack of proper husbanding of 
the federal government's funds causes significant problems, however, an inability to properly 
contract may similar cause substantial problems. While it is important to provide the federal 
government with the appropriate freedom to enter contracts, the duration that the current rule has 
remained unchanged necessitates allowing the status quo ante to remain. 
If the Anti-Deficiency Act were a new law going into effect today, the plain langnage of 
the Act would require courts to interpret the law in a way that walks the fine line between proper 
husbanding of the federal government's ability to spend while allowing sufficient freedom to 
enter mutually beneficial contracts. As it is, however, more harm would likely be done by 
adjusting the standard that contractors rely on than would be done by allowing the current 
interpretation to stand. For the time the federal government must seek express legislative 
authority whenever it requires the use of indemnification provisions and hope that the legislature 
is amenable. 
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